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Abstract  
The deadly violence and ethnic conflicts which defined the 1990s period emphasized the need for an 
effective and viable approach to peacebuilding that shifted from mere containment to strategies that 
fostered the tenets of a sustainable peace. Nevertheless, the peace process can, and is, often hindered 
by actors who seek to undermine it for a myriad of reasons. This essay, aims to analyze how spoiling 
activity affects the peace process and the resulting stability or instability. This will be achieved by 
applying a comparative approach that summarizes the peace processes that took place in Somalia and 
Somaliland between 1991 and 1995. After describing the peace processes, spoiling activity during that 
same period will be highlighted and analyzed to determine how the actions of spoilers, and how 
spoilers were treated, contributed to the situation observed in Somalia and Somaliland. We will be 
analyzing the negative and potentially positive consequences of spoiling activities as well as considering 
the outcomes of including or excluding them from the peace process. The results of this essay shows 
that spoiler actions ultimately undermined and collapsed the peace process in Somalia, due in large to 
spoiling actor’s exclusion from the peace process. On the other hand, spoilers in Somaliland were 
generally included in the peace process which facilitated a more inclusive process that took heed of 
competing interests and grievances and aided in fostering a foundation needed for the creation of a 
sustainable peace.  
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1. Introduction 
The Cold War era defined a global order split between two polarized ideological, political and cultural 
divides, underscored by a mutual standoff between two global superpowers. During this period, 
addressing worldwide insecurities came a distant second to the Cold War politicking of the global 
superpowers as external support was often given to fuel protracted proxy wars, in order to protect 
vested interests.1 The Horn of Africa is a clear example of this, as the region held both strategic and 
economic potential for both superpowers.2 However, the end of the Cold War with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union sparked optimism of the emergence of a new world order that emphasised the 
need to promote and protect democratic norms and ideals built around universal human rights.3 
Nevertheless, the post-Cold War era failed to live up to this new found optimism as the early 1990s 
where defined by deadly violence, ethnic conflict, genocide and massive refugee and population 
flows across borders. The breakdown of multiple states emphasised the need of a revaluation of 
international priorities regarding the security and peace discourse that was “increasingly complex and 
multi-dimensional, going beyond monitoring a ceasefire to actually bringing failed States back to 
life”.4 The concept of peacebuilding, that sought to bridge the divide between security and 
development, provided a viable approach to deal with the range of issues threatening peace and 
security. Here strategies that shifted their aims from mere containment to facilitating, and at times 
spearheading the democratisation and peacebuilding process were increasingly favored. The United 
Nations, taking on the global security role their founders intended, played the dominant role in 
attempting to foster democratic growth and stability in war torn states.5 Nevertheless, the peace 
process is by no means a simple matter, often undermined by groups who aim to hinder and prolong 
peace talks, violate ceasefires and resume violence; these groups are known as spoilers.  
The purpose of “spoiling” a peace initiative is widely varied, however; the unsatisfactory nature 
of the situation after the peace is installed tends to be a universal aspect of all spoiler groups. 
Understanding the motivations and actions of spoilers is however vital to understanding the complex 
                                                 
1 Tschirgi, Necla “Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity 
Closing?”  International Peace Academy, Studies in Security and Development, New York, 2003, p. 1. 
2 Lederach, John Paul, Somalia: creating space for fresh approaches to peacebuilding, Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala, 2011, p. 43. 
3 Tschirgi (2003), p. 3. 
4 Kofi, Annan, The Secretary-General's Message on the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, 29 May 2006. 
http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2006/SG_message06.pdf. 26/10/2015. 
5 Tschirgi (2003), 6-10. 
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nature of conflicts and by understanding the fundamental reasons behind a conflict in turn contributes, 
and is essential to, achieving a sustainable peace.  
We have chosen to apply a comparative analytical examination of two case studies, Somalia 
and Somaliland, to research the implications of spoilers; not only because of their territorial proximity, 
similar culture and actors, but the varied results peace initiatives have achieved.  
Somalia's recent history has been marred by a prolonged violent internal conflict, stretching 
from the removal of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991 to the installment of an internationally backed 
government in 2012 that brought some semblance of stability to the region. On the other hand, 
Somaliland during the same timeline has achieved peace and today enjoys relative stable economic and 
political institutions.6 Understanding this contrast was fundamental to the framing and purpose of this 
essay. We have studied occurrences of spoilers in the peace process in both Somalia and Somaliland 
between 1991-1995 to analyze if they have had any implications to the overarching process of creating 
stability in the region.  
While the evaluation of peace processes may present contrasting explanations for the 
continuation of hostilities, this essay intends to focus on one research question: 
 
I. How can the presence of spoilers and how they were treated explain the contrasting stability 
experienced between 1991-1995 in Somalia and Somaliland? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Walls, Michael. Peace In Somaliland : an Indigenous Approach to State-building: Burao, Borama, and Sanaag Conferences. Hargeisa: 
Academy for Peace and Development (APD) [u.a.], 2008, p.12. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Creating a sustainable peace in states that have experienced prolonged violent conflicts is a complex 
and uncertain process. Nevertheless, the effects of spoilers to this process tends to have relatively 
predictable outcomes and therefore understanding this phenomenon has gained increasing attention 
in the last decade. However, while there has been an increase of interest in spoiling behavior it still 
remains a relatively unexplored area of research. This essay will base its theoretical framework on 
theories of spoilers and their effect on peace processes and the resulting stability or instability. As such 
we follow by outlining previous research on this topic, defining the central concepts of spoilers and 
stability, as well as highlight the transitional peacebuilding discourse.  
 
2.1 Previous research  
Anna K. Jarstad and Kristine Höglund have addressed in their book, From War to Democracy. Dilemmas 
of Peacebuilding, a particular dilemma regarding the inclusion of spoilers in the peace process. This 
horizontal dilemma considers the relationship between different actors in a peace process and the 
different roles they have in bringing an end to violence. They argue that the inclusion of spoilers in 
politics can legitimise and contextualize liberal peacebuilding efforts, but can also undermine the 
peacebuilding process as it may legitimise the use of violence as a political tool.7  
On a similar note, research by Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond on spoilers concludes 
that spoilers are an active component in shaping the local application of generalized ideas of liberal 
democracy. Spoiling is thereby not only synonymous with preventing negotiations, but also prolonging 
them by including local contexts in the negotiation.8 The disruption of peace agreements by actors is 
not a new phenomenon, but the contemporary nature of the concept of “spoiler” is constructed by 
todays internal conflicts, to which we have chosen to focus our essay on. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Jarstad, Anna K. “Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts”. In Jarstad, Anna. K. & Sisk, 
Timothy D., 2008. From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 23, 81. 
8 Newman, Edward & Richmond, Oliver P. (red.), “Challenges to peacebuilding: managing spoilers during conflict resolution”, 
United Nations University Press, Tokyo; New York, 2006, p. 18. 
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2.2 Concept definitions 
As some of the terms used in this essay are broad subjects, often open to interpretation, clarification 
of our use of definitions is required. While academic literature on the phenomenon of spoilers, peace 
operations and stability may not be very well developed, several working definitions of the concept 
have nevertheless been established.  
 
2.2.1 Spoilers  
Stephen John Stedman defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace 
threatens their power, worldview, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to 
achieve it”.9 As such, Stedman argues that spoilers only exist when there is a peace process to 
undermine, as in a conflict a negotiated peace often has losers who would not see the creation of peace 
as beneficial.10 Similarly, Newman & Richmond suggest that spoilers should be a term 
applicable to anyone who opposes the path leading to peace, for whatever reason, whether included 
or excluded in the official process.11 This is highlighted by Stedman who also claims that spoilers can 
be either inside or outside the peace process.12  
 On the other hand, Newman & Richmond’s study also questions the normative judgment of 
spoilers as inherently bent on obstructing the process of peace.13 Instead, they theorize, it is the 
components of a peace settlement that collides with the aims and goals of groups, thus removing 
peace in itself as the obstacle to be objected. Therefore, the driving initiatives of spoilers should be 
analyzed to possibly include, or remove, certain aspects in the progress for sustainable peace. Adopting 
this formulation in our essay as well, we also aim to analyze the struggle between the warring parties 
not as a conflict over peace, but a conflict over possible settlements or marginalization of existing 
culture and norms. However, as both studies highlight, spoilers can also fundamentally obstruct the 
path to stability, and their role in spoiling the peace process is of main concern to our essay.    
 
 
                                                 
9 Stedman, Stephen John. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, in Stern, Paul C. & Druckman, Daniel 
(red.), International conflict resolution after the Cold War [Elektronisk resurs], National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, 
p. 178. 
10 Ibid., p. 180. 
11 Newman & Richmond (2006), p.4. 
12 Ibid., p. 182-183. 
13 Newman & Richmond (2006), p. 2. 
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2.2.2 Peace Operations  
In order to create a sustainable peace in a country experiencing a violent conflict, some form of peace 
process must take place. Understanding, therefore the discourses surrounding peacekeeping 
operations are useful in comprehending the role spoilers play in shaping post conflict societies. The 
post-Cold War era saw a dramatic rise in UN led peacekeeping missions, the majority of which utilized 
an approach that favored fostering and promoting liberal and democratic norms in war torn states. 
This liberal peace approach is based on the argument that democratic forms of government are more 
likely to be peaceful and as such the rapid liberalisation of states would foster a stable sustainable 
peace in countries that experienced violent conflicts.14 This approach, typically utilizes a top-down 
strategy, based off Western templates, which emphasizes the organization of fair elections, the creation 
of a market economy, the separation of power and the promotion of human rights and civil society.15  
Nevertheless the weakness of the liberal peace approach has been highlighted by the myriad 
of peacekeeping failures that have been observed in the 1990s. Central to the critique is its exclusion 
and marginalization of local actors in the peace process. As such, in lieu of these past failures, a ‘local 
turn’ has today become increasingly prominent in approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This 
approach seeks to understand the changing conditions of peace by necessitating a more expansive 
approach that encompasses a wider range of peacebuilding actors especially at the local level.16 
  
2.2.3 Stability  
To understand the contrasting situation in Somalia and Somaliland it is necessary to explain the 
definition of stability we will use. To find a fitting approach we have applied Leon Hurwitz definition 
of stability. Hurwitz presents stability as; (1) the absence of violence; (2) governmental 
longevity/endurance; (3) the existence of legitimate constitutional order; (4) absence of structural 
change; (5) a multifaceted societal attribute.17 Therefore in this essay, in view of Hurwitz’s five 
indicators, the resulting situation in Somaliland will be represented as stable and Somalia unstable.   
 
                                                 
14 Paris, Roland, At war's end: building peace after civil conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 5, 55. 
15 Autesserre, Séverine, Peaceland: conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international intervention, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 52. 
16 Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver Richmond (2013) ”The Local Turn in Peacebuilding: Critical Agenda for Peacebuilding”, 
Third World Quarterly, 34(5): p. 764. 
17 Hurwitz, L. (1973). ‘Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability’, Comparative Politics 5, p. 449-463. 
  
- 6 - 
 
3. Methodological Framework 
 
The theoretical framework that has been developed above highlights the multifaceted nature of 
spoilers and the different approaches and interpretations that have been advanced over the past 
decade. As such, considering the complex character of the subject at hand, certain limitations and 
clarifications must be made to specify this essay’s focus as well as formalize the analytical tools that 
will be utilized. This section therefore will aim to illustrate our methodological framework and define 
our choice of material, time frame and region of focus.    
 
3.1 Choice of region 
Considering our research question, it is understandable that our focus in this essay will be on two 
specific territorial regions. As this essay will compare different methods of addressing spoilers, Somalia 
and Somaliland presents an opportunity to study this comparison in context of a homogenous culture, 
religion and social climate.18 This homogeneity removes several of the factors which could jeopardize 
the fundamental understanding of spoilers as an explanatory factor to the degree of stability in Somalia 
and Somaliland.  
Despite their similarities, the Republic of Somaliland, while not internationally recognized as 
a sovereign state, is considered an autonomous region with a working political system, constitution 
and currency separate from Somalia. As such, Somaliland is, in all but international recognition, an 
independently functioning state. Therefore, in this essay we will consider Somaliland as its own distinct 
region separate from the country of Somalia. The situation of Somaliland is not unique however, as 
Puntland is also a semi-autonomous region that has seceded from Somalia and experiences the same 
relative stability found in Somaliland. However, while including Puntland would have made the essay 
more comprehensive, the choice to focus on one specific region was shaped by ensuring the scope of 
this essay was not too broad.19 
 
 
                                                 
18 O'Neill, John Terence & Rees, Nicholas, “United Nations Peacekeeping In The Post-cold War Era” [Elektronisk resurs], 
Taylor & Francis Ltd, Hoboken, 2005, p. 100. 
19 Barakat S, Connolly D, Hardman F, Lewis A, Lineker B, Menkhaus K, Rzeszut K, and Shanks K (2014), Beyond 
Fragility: A Conflict and Education Analysis of the Somali Context. University of York/UNICEF, Somalia, Kenya, p. 75. 
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3.2 Comparative study   
As the aim of this essay is to analyze the role spoilers have had in creating the varying stability in 
Somalia and Somaliland, a methodological approach that utilizes a comparative framework seemed 
most suitable. Comparison is a vital and significant tool of any analysis and can aid in establishing 
empirical relationships between different variables.20 This method is useful as it allows us to examine 
cases in detail which in turn could contribute to developing relevant additional variables that have 
significant theoretical value.21 However, using a comparative method limits us to material that is 
comparable, excluding unique factors that possibly could offer alternate explanations in the 
understanding of spoilers influence on the peace process. This methodological approach is therefore 
beneficial for this essay in several ways. Firstly, it will help bring to light the similarities and differences 
between the two chosen regions, regarding the peace processes and the prevalence of spoilers. 
Secondly, by highlighting these differences and similarities, we can integrate explanatory factors that 
may help clarify the contradictory situations observed in Somalia and Somaliland.  
This research paper will rely mainly on previously recorded information that is, examining 
previous reports of the peace process. It will thereby try to remove any uncertainty of undisclosed 
aspects, with purpose to build on contemporary research, not formulate new areas of study. Our 
reasoning is that by relying on a factual comparative method the aim is to guarantee that emphasis is 
placed on how the study conforms to practice, not theory.  Overall we suggest the use of comparative 
analysis is most suited for our essay, as the implications of spoilers on a peace process is almost a 
limitless subject making the discovery of general reactions too complicated. 
 
3.3 Time frame 
Following on, this essay will be limited to the time frame between 1991 and 1995. The reasoning 
behind this is because of the limited amount of material on the peace process in Somalia after 1995, 
and in Somaliland prior to 1991. Peace initiatives in Somalia and Somaliland officially started in 1991 
with the political upheaval of the previous regime and removal of Siad Barre, officially seen as a starting 
point for the political instabilities in Somalia and the secession of Somaliland. The period of study 
ends in 1995 with the withdrawal of the UN and almost all affiliated groups.22 This timespan gives us 
                                                 
20 Lijphart, Arend “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 
3 (Sep., 1971), p. 683.  
21 Ibid., p. 692. 
22 United Nations Operation in Somalia II http://www.un.org/DEpts/DPKO/Missions/UNOSOM2b.htm. 
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the opportunity to study a time period of frequent occurrences of spoilers and their implications on 
the peace process, but limits the amount of material processed for a more extensive case study.  
 
3.4 Choice of variables, definitions and literature 
The previous sections have outlined the extensive nature of our choice of research which validates 
our choice to adopt a narrower approach. As our aim in this essay is to analyze how stability varies in 
the two regions as a result of the influence of spoilers, our research will be outlined by an independent 
variable; spoilers, and one dependent; stability. 
Our analysis will utilize a definition of spoilers that borrows from both Newman & Richmond 
and Stedman. We will use Stedman’s definition that considers spoilers as individuals or groups whose 
direct actions undermine the peace process but also take into account Newman and Richmond's claim 
that spoilers may counteract possible marginalization of local actors and beliefs. Similarly, when 
analyzing the possible effect of spoilers we will consider the horizontal dilemma of inclusion and 
exclusion as outlined by Jarstad & Sisk to better help us categorize the effects of spoilers pertinent to 
our case.  
 This essay draws upon a wide array of literature consisting mainly of academic books, articles 
and reports. This material developed a foundation of basic understanding and provided a context to 
apply our analytical method on. Somaliland's lack of international recognition posed a dilemma to our 
choice of material on Somalia as it often failed to acknowledge Somaliland as a separate territorial 
region. As such this required a process of analyzing the facts before verifying them as valid to our 
research. Nevertheless, considering Somaliland’s non-sovereign status, material useful to our study is 
limited. A national bias is therefore not possible to exclude and may possibly influence our analysis. 
We will aim to achieve the above by first providing a chronological in depth description of 
peace initiatives, defined as peacekeeping and peace building, undertaken in both Somalia and 
Somaliland between 1991 and 1995. We will follow by highlighting the main spoiling activity recorded 
in each region based on our chosen definition, during the same period. To clarify, we will consider 
spoiling activity to be any actions that undermined or aimed to undermine the peace processes in both 
regions. These actions can be either violent, in the form of the use of physical force, or non-violent, 
by refusing to sign a ceasefire for example. To understand the purpose of these actions, we will base 
our analysis on our chosen definition. After this, we will analyze the relationship between these two 
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variables, building off Jarstad & Sisk’s horizontal dilemma, to study if, and how, the spoiling activity 
recorded in both regions affected the peace process and the resulting varying levels of stability.  
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4. Case Briefings  
 
 
While Somalia has had a long and turbulent history marred by conflict, the ousting of Siad Barre and 
his administration from power in 1991, marked a significant deterioration of statehood and stability 
in Somalia.23 This period saw the region descend into a large scale civil war, as rival warlords and clan 
chiefs all vied for political and economic power. Central to this struggle was the Hawiye clan, whose 
two rival leaders, Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Mohamed Farrah Aideed, both sought control over the 
region. The leaders’ bitter rivalry, effectively split Mogadishu into two warring camps, initiating a 
protracted violent conflict.24 The international community responded by engaging in peacekeeping 
operations that aimed to restore stability. The United Nations, supported by the United States (US), 
was the dominant actor during this period, as such our focus in the next section will be directed at 
peace operations conducted by the UN in Somalia. During this same period however, actors in 
Somaliland took advantage of the chaos created by the conflict to begin their secession from Somalia.25 
This is important to note as international efforts to bring an end to the conflict focused on Somalia 
as a whole and did not consider Somaliland as a separate country. As such the peace process in 
Somaliland was significantly different from Somalia, both in actors involved but also the strategies 
adopted and their results. We will focus therefore on conferences organized by local actors when 
reviewing the peace process in Somaliland. 
 
4.1 Peace process in Somalia: 1991-1995 
On the 24th of April 1992 resolution 751 was passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
establishing the foundations of The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I).26 First off, 
the directive of UNOSOM I meant the implementation of 50 observers, appointed to supervise and 
retain an already implemented ceasefire between the two major warring factions and their leaders; 
Aideed and Mahdi.27 Secondly, to improve the humanitarian situation, increased personal was 
stationed to protect the transports of supplies from a growing number of possible threats. In this 
                                                 
23 Murphy, Ray, UN “Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: operational and legal issues in practice”, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 48. 
24 O'Neill (2005) p. 100. 
25 Walls (2008), p. 12. 
26 Murphy (2007), p. 51. 
27 Ibid., p. 49. 
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phase of the conflict, UN sought mainly to support a local re-stabilisation of society, not directly 
intervene to produce stability itself. However, as the stability in Somalia decreased more UN personnel 
were stationed in the region around Mogadishu. Despite this, the deployment of these troops was 
severely delayed due to the UN’s failure to seek consent from the leaders of the warring factions, who 
refused to cooperate as a result.28 UNOSOM I was unsuccessful in dealing with the challenges it faced, 
due in part to its small scale and limited mandate, but also because it failed to address the fundamental 
problem in Somalia; the total collapse of state authority in the country.29  
With growing demands from the international community to bring an end to the conflict, The 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established on the 3rd of December 1992 under UNSC resolution 
794.30 The resolution proclaimed the need for a further increase of troops in Somalia authorizing the 
use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia”.31 While UNITAF was a multinational operation, the US agreed to 
spearhead the operation, contributing over 28,000 soldiers who succeeded in opening up supply routes 
that helped reinvigorate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Although UNITAF improved the 
humanitarian situation in Somalia, communicative and administrative complications resulted in 
unclear strategic goals, which negatively affected the operations potential to reduce violence.32 
UNITAF therefore was deemed a success, facilitating the transition to the UN’s next operation. 
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established under UNSC 
resolution 814 on the 26th March 1993.33 The operations initial mandate was to continue to protect 
humanitarian personnel and supplies, but differed from previous resolutions, in its authorization to 
disarm Somali militias and begin the state building process.34. As the operation continued it became 
apparent that the creation of a stable and secure environment, that was supposed to be generated 
during UNITAF, was not complete which forced UNOSOM II to shift it operational focus, which 
had detrimental effects to the current situation.35 Tensions culminated when 24 UN soldiers, tasked 
with inspecting a weapon storage owned by Aideed, were killed by Aideed’s militia, resulting in the 
                                                 
28 O’Neill (2005), p. 103. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Murphy (2007), p. 317. 
31 UN Security Council, Resolution 794 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3 December 1992, 3 
December 1992, S/RES/794 (1992). 
32 Ibid., p. 60-61. 
33 Ibid., p. 318. 
34 O’Neill (2005), p. 107. 
35 Ibid., p. 108. 
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UN passing Resolution 837, which effectively declared war on the Somali warlord.36 However, the 
new resolution was unsuccessful and instead increased tensions between the UN and Aideed’s faction, 
culminating in the disastrous battle of Mogadishu. This event posed a significant turn for UNOSOM 
II, as it resulted in the withdrawal of the majority of US troops from Somalia. With the withdrawal of 
vital personal, the UN mission was continually unable to deal with the increasingly violent military 
groups, and ended in 1995 with a final resolution to abandon the UN mission in Somalia.37 
 
4.2 Spoilers in Somalia Peace process  
As the above has highlighted, by 1995 the UN had failed in their general goal to create a stable Somalia, 
with the country’s power still in the hands of competing warlords. While the peacekeeping strategies 
that were employed in the country can themselves be questioned, actions taken that undermined the 
peace process significantly contributed to the subsequent failure and withdrawal of the UN from 
Somalia. The conflict, instigated between two of the biggest factions of the civil war, Somali National 
Movement (SNA) and United Somali Congress (USC), centered on which appointed leader would 
bring economic and political reconstruction to the nation.38 Aideed (SNA) and Mahdi (USC), the 
representatives of both factions both contributed to the failures of the peace process by the spoiling 
activity they either ordered or took part in themselves. 
The original mandate of UNOSOM I was to monitor the prearranged ceasefire and the 
transportation of humanitarian aid and while Mahdi and Aideed had agreed to halt hostilities, UN 
convoys with aid were systematically targeted and looted by local militias. Aideed took advantage of 
the UN’s lack of security, hijacking humanitarian aid as soon as it left the Mogadishu ports, looting 
valuable aid.39 The continuous plundering and attacks on UN aid convoys significantly reduced the 
effectiveness of UNOSOM I which in turn hindered their capacity to provide humanitarian assistance 
in the country.40 
As a result of the increased attacks on UN personnel, UNITAF was established to provide 
increased security. Nevertheless, while the operation of UNITAF was deemed successful, it was 
significantly hampered by the rivalry of Mahdi and Aideed. Aideed especially, developed animosity 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Murphy (2007), p. 193-194. 
38 Mayall, James (red.), The new interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 106. 
39 O’Neill (2005), p. 102. 
40 Murphy (2007), p. 54. 
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towards the intervening actors, due to their preferential treatment of Mahdi and began encouraging a 
negative attitude towards the international intervention in Somalia.41 On the contrary, Mahdi to an 
extent saw UN as a tool to be used in the campaign for power, following the rules as it fitted him.42 
Furthermore, due to the UN’s reluctance to disarm the dominant warlords in the country, both Aideed 
and Mahdi took the opportunity to stockpile weapons. While this did not undermine UNITAF in 
itself, UN’s oversight proved fatal in their next operation.43 
Tensions in 1993, during UNOSOM II, resulted in the highpoint of UN activity in the region, 
to where the goals of humanitarian aid was deemed accomplished, which switched focus towards the 
conflict, which was raging in Mogadishu.44 UNOSOM II’s mandate to disarm local groups, by force 
if necessary, was received by Aideed a direct measure to pacify and neutralize his faction who increased 
attacks on UN forces. The most notable of which resulted in the deaths of 24 UN soldiers who were 
killed during a weapon inspection of a storage facility belonging to Aideed.45 This event showed 
Aideed’s total disregard of the peace process and proved the tipping point for the relationship between 
Aideed and the UN. The militarized actions against troops however led the US, outside of UN control, 
to lead a force into Mogadishu to capture Aideed. However, the mission was a failure, ending in the 
loss of two helicopters and 18 soldiers while Aideed survived.46 The negative trends progressed 
throughout the following year, as violence against UN personnel was on the increase. The opinion of 
UN’s mission as a failure gained ground in the UNSC and during 1995 the last personal in any of the 
mandates given during the conflict was withdrawn, ending the UN mission in Somalia.47 
 
4.3 Peace process in Somaliland: 1991-1995 
The peace process of Somaliland was initiated prior to the downfall of Siad Barre by the Somali 
National Movement (SNM). Originating from a Somali diaspora in London and made up by members 
from the dominant Isaaq-clan, SNM quickly became a legitimate actor fighting the regime due to its 
inclusive nature.48 As such, while the collapse of Barre’s administration in 1991 prompted a struggle 
                                                 
41 O’Neill (2005), p. 106. 
42 Ibid., p. 105. 
43 Murphy (2007), p. 61-62. 
44 O’Neill (2005), p. 105. 
45 Ibid., p. 109. 
46 Murphy (2007), p. 187. 
47 Mayall (1996), p. 120. 
48 Phillips, Sarah (2013) “Political Settlements and State Formation: The Case of Somaliland ”, Development Leadership 
Program: University of Sydney, p. 44.  
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for power between competing factions in the southern and central regions of Somalia, the SNM 
emerged as the dominant actor in the Northern region of Somalia. Nevertheless, hostilities between 
the SNM and other competing clans in the northern region continued which prompted preliminary 
talks to end the inter-clan conflicts. However, while international actors were involved in the peace 
process in Somalia, local actors both engaged and facilitated the peace process in Somaliland. This 
process was initiated through major conferences and meetings that were open to all clan leaders with 
the underlying aim of creating a sustainable peace and coexistence between the dominant Isaaq-clan 
and the less powerful.49 
The conference of Berbera was the first conference that gathered delegates from all the 
northern clans in order to establish a regional ceasefire.50 Due to the inclusive nature of the conference, 
the first steps towards a collective foundation for future reconciliation were taken as it established 
initial policies aimed at coexistence between all the Northern clans.51 
With a ceasefire in place, on the 27th April 1991 all Northern clans participated in the Burao 
conference which set out to continue the reconciliation process as well as discuss Somaliland’s future. 
During this conference the establishment of several fundamental factors to the sovereignty and state 
building were discussed and agreed upon.52 Firstly, the sovereignty of the northern region of Somalia 
was for the first time officially declared and agreed upon as an autonomous nation of Somalia, named 
Somaliland.53 Secondly, a decision-making body was created, comprising of individuals belonging to 
the SNM: he Central Committee. Thirdly, SNM Chairman, Abdirahman Ali Tuur, accepted the mantle 
as the first president of the new Republic of Somaliland.54 Despite the celebratory mood in Somaliland 
at that time, the peace that existed was still fragile, with tensions between clans and factions still 
significant. This was highlighted in 1992 when violent power struggles erupted over the control of 
infrastructure and revenue in Berbera and Burao, threatening to plunge Somaliland into a protracted 
civil war similar to that taking place in Mogadishu.55 As a response however to the growing hostilities, 
the Sheekh conference was organised on the 23rd October 1992 in an attempt to bring an end to the 
conflicts in Buruo and Berbera as well as consolidate peace between the warring clans. The discord of 
                                                 
49 Jhazbhay, Iqbal, 2009. “Somaliland: The Journey of Resistance, Reconciliation and Peace”. African Safety Promotion. 
Vol. 7, No. 1. pp. 52. 
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432 (2009), pp. 380. 
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53 Wall (2009), p. 374. 
54 Wall (2008), p. 39. 
55 Iqbal (2009), p. 60. 
  
- 15 - 
 
SNM between the conferences of Burao (1991) and Sheekh (1992) had however reduced the Central 
Committees capacity for action. Thus the President decided to temporarily transfer decision-making 
power towards a mixed mediation group made up mainly of clan elders, known in Somaliland as 
Guurti.56 This new council was established to deal with internal security issues that threatened the 
stability forged in Somaliland with the intent to legitimize the state formation process.57 Despite these 
measures, peace remained fragile in Somaliland, which necessitated the establishment of a subsequent 
conference that was to take place in the first months of 1993. 
The Borama conference took place in January 1993 and included all previous delegates.58 Led 
by the Guurti, the promulgation of a Peace Charter for the entire region of Somaliland and a national 
constitutional framework that outlined governing principles of law and order in accordance with local 
traditions and faith was established.59 The Charter effectively established a democratic governing body 
in Somaliland with Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal replacing Tuur as the President of Somaliland.60 The 
conference was therefore marked by Somaliland’s complete transition from SNM’s primarily military 
party system to a civilian system of democracy, without any hardships. The Borama conference was 
vital in establishing a government that addressed and respected the issues of representation and power 
sharing of Somaliland’s main clans, integrating traditional and modern approaches that fostered a 
balanced form of governance.61  
 After Egal’s succession as the second President of Somaliland, disputes in the political arena 
threatened the hard forged stability in Somaliland. However, Egal endured and managed to secure the 
foundations of the Republic of Somaliland, establish institutions of government, demobilise local 
militias and secure an environment for economic recovery.62  
 
4.4 Spoilers in Somaliland Peace process  
While Egal’s administration managed to establish a relative stability and create the foundations needed 
for the formation of the Somaliland Republic, the peace process however can be understood as a cycle 
of conflicts born from the different perceptions of how the process of stability should have been 
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directed.63 The major peace conferences provided a platform for clan leaders to air their grievances in 
order to unify vested interests in the region. Despite these measures, tensions still culminated in 
conflicts between clans competing over economic and strategic assets. 
Although the declaration of sovereignty at the Burao conference temporarily pacified the 
region of Somaliland, a fragile peace still existed and was underlined by a flare in violence that took 
place in the early months of 1992.64 These outbreaks of fighting involved rival militia factions within 
the SNM, who were unsatisfied by the uneven distribution of weaponry after the conflict with Siad 
Barre had ended. As such instances of banditry, looting and violent clashes began to rise in the regions 
of Berbera and Burao against the backdrop of Presidents Tuur’s efforts to form a national military 
force aimed at disarming local militias.65 The dominant position of certain clans within the SNM 
presented a potential obstacle by lesser members in their attempt to prevent possible marginalization 
in the process of shaping the future system.66 Similarly, unemployed youths in the region found 
themselves with easy access to weapons and with little to do after the cessation of the conflict, many 
turned to violence and banditry. These conflicts, while small scale, still hampered the main aim of the 
peace conferences, namely establishing and fostering trust between the Northern clans. 
While several meetings were held in attempt to deescalate the situation, by March 1992 
tensions had once again resumed as allied clans to the SNM began questioning the future of the region. 
Central to these concerns was the issue of who would have control over Berbera Port which counted 
as the only substantial sources of income for the government.67 The conflict over Berber port 
culminated in May 1992 when SNM veteran, Abdillaahi Degaweyne asserted his claim on the area, 
which prompted a violent power struggle between competing factions and aided in deepening clan 
divisions. In August Degaweyne had managed to chase government forces out of Berbera and 
ultimately weakening their hold over the region. Consequently, as conflicts were becoming more 
frequent, small groups within the clans saw the distraction of a relapse into conflict as weakening the 
Central Committee of Somaliland, and broke into armed struggles to gain momentum in increasing 
their own powers.68 Although spoilers were at an all-time high, the Sheekh conference and resulting 
Borama conference were arranged to unite clan conflicts, effectively creating the stability needed for 
state formation.  
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5. Analysis 
As our case briefings have highlighted, actors and strategies utilized in the peace processes of Somalia 
and Somaliland differed widely. Spoilers on the other hand were present and operational in both 
situations, yet the peace processes ended very differently as relative stability established in Somaliland 
while near complete state collapse occurred in Somalia. It is therefore our aim to analyze how the 
presence of spoilers and how they were treated could explain the differing levels of stability observed 
in the two regions. 
 In Somalia, initial looting and attacks on UN personnel directly influenced the establishment 
of UNISOM I and despite the deployment of UN troops, the operation was continuously undermined 
by the continued looting and attacks of UN personnel. This spoiling activity deteriorated the 
humanitarian situation to the degree where the UN deployed UNITAF in an attempt to regain order. 
While its mandate to reestablish the transportation of humanitarian aid was fulfilled, the failure to 
disarm Mahdi and Aideed proved fatal in the long run as they grew increasingly dangerous and were 
therefore able to undermine the continued policies introduced by the UN. The culmination of spoiler 
actions resulted in the killing of 24 UN personnel during UNOSOM II and initiated the collapse of 
the peace process in Somalia. Understanding spoilers through our chosen definition that considers 
spoilers as actors performing actions with the purpose of undermining the peace process or/and with 
the purpose of counteracting marginalization of certain groups, offers an interpretation more 
applicable than the other.  
Considering Aideed and Mahdi primarily pro-acted, not re-acted to decisions made by the UN, 
their purpose, according to our information, must therefore have been to spoil the process aimed to 
bring peace to Somalia in order to receive highest amount of gains from the conflict. Further, for 
Aideed’s and Mahdi’s spoiling actions to negate possible marginalization of the local population 
required specific assumptions that did not correlate with reality at that time. First off Aideed and 
Mahdi had to be considered protagonists in a situation where the UN was perceived as an antagonist. 
Id est, they would be conveying the will of the local population in an attempt to counteract a stronger 
power’s attempt to imperialize them, which was not the case. Secondly, Aideed and Mahdi were 
primarily obstructing humanitarian aid, not providing it, which argues that their interests were put 
ahead of the wellbeing of the Somali people. Thirdly, while the UN attempted to include both actors 
within the process towards peace, it was the rivalry between Aideed and Mahdi that was the obstacle 
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to overcome in order to achieve stability. This suggests that Aideed and Mahdi had a negative effect 
on the peace process. 
Seeing how spoilers were treated in the Somali peace process can also help us to understand 
why a sustainable peace was never achieved. Co-operation of both parties was initially dependable, 
especially as both Aideed and Mahdi were willing to sign a UN approved ceasefire. However, mistrust 
between the interveners and Somali actors began to grow as additional UN troops were approved 
without the consent of either Somali actor. This went against early promises to include all actors in 
the peace process and aided in establishing a level of distrust between the UN, Aideed and Mahdi. 
Although efforts to disarm the warring factions were held back, UN did not assume direct 
responsibility to end the fighting nor solve the political dispute. Similarly, with Mahdi claiming the 
presidential role, UN policies were accused of benefitting him over Aideed and while this may not 
have been correct, it did aid in further marginalizing Aideed from the peace process. As such Aideed’s 
increased use of violence to undermine the peace process could be seen as a result of the UN’s failure 
to effectively include him in.  
With the UN increasingly excluding Aideed from the peace process, mistrust between the 
actors began to grow. Meanwhile the UN losing credibility with their role as peacemakers increasingly 
being questioned. Following, the mandate to completely exclude Aideed from the process was given 
in resolution 814 (UNISOM II). Due to the resolution’s hardline “all means necessary” mandate it can 
be comprehensible as the point of no return. We found several points in the resolution confirming 
this, including; the increasingly offensive methods adopted by the UN, the declaration of Aideed and 
Mahdi as enemies to the UN mission and the disarming of both factions through, if necessary, the use 
of force. This left the actors with very little incentive to concede power which made finding a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict almost impossible, as such, greater risks were taken and consequently bigger 
prices had to be paid. 
On the other hand, to understand UN’s reluctance to exclude both factions, it is important to 
keep in mind the stimulus of co-operation that occurred during the first and second UN negotiated 
ceasefire, which made their status as inside or outside the UN mission a perplexing issue. Rather, the 
belief that they could benefit from the situation after the UN withdrawal influenced decisions made 
until UNOSOM II. Observing the situation by using Jarstad and Höglunds horizontal dilemma, the 
decision to include spoilers allowed for continued spoiling to be used as a political tool in order to 
receive further benefits. Nevertheless, the underlying difference between what the UN said and what 
they did was a factor that caused spoilers to mistrust the actual purpose of the UN. Consequently, the 
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UN increased troops as Aideed grew more violent, and Aideed grew more violent as the UN increased 
troops. This culminated in the violence of 1993, where Aideed caused enough damage to international 
forces to initiate the dismantling of the peace process in Somalia. 
Moving on, while the peace process in Somaliland was inherently different from that in 
Somalia, spoilers were nevertheless active and influenced the process. Understanding why stability was 
established in Somaliland, requires us to analyze the purpose of spoilers and how they were treated. 
The spoiling activity that took place in Somaliland was fueled by clashing clan interests. Initially this 
took the form of violent clashes perpetrated by actors within the SNM who were unsatisfied by the 
unequal distribution of resources but also SNM’s growing power in the newly formed state. Similarly, 
unemployed youths began engaging in banditry and looting and violence therefore increased. 
Nevertheless tensions and spoiler activity culminated in March 1992 with the conflict over Berbera 
Port. These actions marked one of the most significant challenges to the peace process and threatened 
to derail all progress made so far in Somaliland. 
 Considering once again our chosen definition that outlines the purpose of spoilers as both 
detrimental to the peace process but also capable of countering marginalization, it is evident both 
aspects were present in the Somaliland peace process. The initial looting, banditry and violence that 
was observed in early 1992 significantly halted peace progress and aided in creating mistrust between 
clans but also weakened SNM’s ability to maintain stability. Their aim was therefore to obstruct peace 
as it would reduce their temporary assertion to power. These actions essentially undermined the 
fundamental goal of the peace conferences, namely the unification of Northern clans as the foundation 
of the Somaliland state. As such these spoiler actions can be considered as detrimental to the peace 
process.  
However to understand the underlying concept of spoiling in Somaliland requires a conception 
of spoiling with the purpose to prevent marginalization, and not only as an attempt to obstruct peace 
in itself. Considering this, the SNM by 1992 held the majority of power with President Tuur and the 
Central Committee comprising the major decision making body. The spoiling activity was therefore 
never aimed at initiating conflict, but a reaction to the potential exclusion from the structure of power. 
Since SNM did not provide any answers to how and who would be able to conceive power in their 
resignation, uncertainty of the future situation became an incentive to spoiling. The Berbera Port 
conflict can also be used to confirm this argument, as the port was traditionally inhabited by several 
groups who shared the revenue generated. This however was threatened by Tuur’s attempt to increase 
SNM’s control over revenue flows. Although, the actions taken by the spoiler groups at Berbera can 
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be seen as being motivated by personal economic gain, it is important to see that these actions were 
taken to protect clan interests as well. As such while the spoilers can still be seen as detrimental to the 
peace process, they nevertheless forced the SNM to accept and take heed of the interests of other 
smaller clans.    
While spoilers were active during the Somaliland peace process, the way they were handled 
and treated was inherently different from Somalia. The peace conferences were organized with the 
recognition that high levels of inclusivity was necessary to create a peace that was not only accepted 
by all but that was able to last. The inclusive nature that would permeate Somaliland’s peace process 
was facilitated by the majority of clans descending from the Isaaq-clan, and as such, bonds between 
its sub-clans were already in existence. By arranging peace conferences where all clans were invited, 
the risk of potential disruptions was greatly reduced, and even though several occurrences of spoiling 
behavior took place, they were relatively low, especially compared to Somalia. Furthermore, by 
including a large number of different actors, the legitimacy of the outcomes from the peace 
conferences was effectively widened and mediation between numerically dominant and less powerful 
clans was facilitated. 
The exclusion of spoilers was never considered; most likely due to the problems it would have 
caused the process of state building. This was underlined by the establishment of the Guurti, which 
was mainly made up by mixed elders from all clans and in turn provided enough trust for the minor 
clans to accept their representation in the state formation process. In turn the Guurti transitioned 
power to a governmental structure accepted by all. By transitioning power from a single group to an 
open democratic system, inclusion was established as a permanent guarantee, to which conflicts over 
power were negated. The formation of the Guurti can therefore be considered a culmination of spoiling 
actions and the inclusive nature of the peace conferences. Somaliland did achieve stability, according 
to our definition, within the timeframe of 1991-1995, to where the peace process was neither seriously 
hampered nor obstructed by the occurrence of spoilers, but rather spoiling made its contents equally 
beneficial to the population of Somaliland. 
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6. Conclusion  
The case studies of Somalia and Somaliland illustrate the complex nature of peace processes and the 
significant consequences that result out of spoiling activity. The aim of this essay was to analyze how 
spoilers affected the peace processes in Somalia and Somaliland, but also consider how their treatment 
could clarify the varying levels of resulting stability. 
 The purpose of spoilers in both regions were fundamentally different. In Somalia spoiling 
actions orchestrated by Mahdi and Aideed were motivated by personal interests and the consolidation 
of absolute power in the country. As such, the spoiling actions undertaken by both actors can be 
understood as attempts to protect their own interest to the detriment of the peace process. In 
Somaliland, creating peace was the fundamental goal which overrode personal or clan based interest. 
As such, spoiling actors effectively operated with the aim of counteracting the marginalization of their 
clans or sub-clans. The treatment of spoilers in the regions also had significant effects on the creation 
of stability. The UN’s choice to ultimately exclude spoilers in Somalia effectively fueled the rivalry 
between Aideed and Mahdi and facilitated the breakdown of relations between them and the UN. On 
the other hand SNM’s choice to include all spoilers encouraged legitimacy for the outcomes of the 
conferences and facilitated in shaping a peace process that respected all clan interests.  
As such the regression to instability in Somalia is the result of spoiling actions undertaken by 
Aideed and Mahdi which were shaped by the UN’s exclusion of them from the peace process. On the 
other hand, the foundation of stability in Somaliland is the result of the inclusive nature of the 
conferences and the spoiling effect of countering marginalization of clan interests.  
As the effect of spoiling on the peace process varies depending on variables such as, how the 
peace process was implemented, what actor was driving it and how it treated spoiling, the issue in 
itself is complex. However, given the homogeneity of the regions, the application of a similar study 
on different regions would possibly propose an even greater web of variables, as to where our study 
therefore is a compilation of the more generalized factors of spoilers. In conclusion, our research has 
shown the importance of considering local contexts and the treatment and purpose of spoilers in 
understanding the resulting stability. As such this model can be applied to other conflicts with a 
different context to further understand the consequences of spoilers in peace processes.   
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